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Digest: People v. Gay 
Ryan Odenwalder 
Opinion by Baxter, J., with Kennard, Acting C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin, 
J., Moreno, J., Corrigan, J., and Marchiano, J. Concurring Opinion by 
Werdegar, J., with Kennard, Acting C. J., and Marchiano, J. 
Issue 
Can a defendant present evidence at a penalty retrial about the 
circumstances of the offense that is inconsistent with the verdict reached in 
the guilt phase of the trial pursuant to California Penal Code section 190.3? 
Facts 
Kenneth Gay (Gay) and Raynard Cummings (Cummings) were 
charged with the murder of a police officer, Paul Verna (Officer Verna), 
during a traffic stop. 1 The prosecution suggested that their motive was to 
avoid prosecution for four "brutal" robberies they had recently committed.2 
During these robberies, their wives, Pamela Cummings (Pamela) and Robin 
Gay (Robin), accompanied them, with Pamela as driver.3 Gay, who was of 
mixed race, would sit in the front passenger seat, and Raynard, who was 
black, would sit in the back.4 
Less than two weeks after the latest robbery, Officer Verna pulled 
over the car containing Cummings and Gay and their wives. 5 The car had 
been stolen and its license plates switched.6 Pamela exited the car and was 
unable to produce registration.7 As Officer Verna approached the car to 
talk to the men inside, Cummings shot the Officer in the shoulder. 8 In 
total, Officer Verna was shot with six bullets from the same gun. 9 
Testimony from various eyewitnesses conflicted over whether Gay or 
Cummings fired the additional shots. 10 
1 People v. Gay, 178 P.3d 422, 424 (Cal. 2008). 
2 !d. at 424-25. 
3 !d. at 425. 
4 !d. 
s !d. at 426. 
6 !d. 
7 !d. 
8 !d. 
9 !d. at 430. 
10 !d. at 427--29. 
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Several hours later, the four met to discuss the shooting. 11 The wives' 
testimony conflicted as to whether Gay claimed credit for the shooting. 12 
On her way home, Pamela stopped and anonymously called the police to 
report that a man resembling Cummings shot Officer Vema. 13 The next 
day, undercover police officers followed Robin and Pamela to Oceanside, 
where they met up with their husbands. 14 The police intercepted their car 
and arrested them, finding Cummings and Gay hidden in the back seat. 15 
After her arrest, Pamela admitted that she had lied to the police and 
agreed to cooperate in exchange for a reduction of the charges against 
her. 16 Gay and Cummings were tried together. 17 Pamela testified that, after 
Cummings fired the initial shot, Gay shot Vema in the back and then fired 
two additional shots standing over Vema. 18 While some eyewitnesses 
corroborated these facts, others identified Cummings as the shooter. 19 
After evidence in aggravation was presented, a jury convicted both 
men of murder and sentenced them to death.20 Gay filed a writ of habeas 
corpus claiming ineffective counsel for the penalty phase of the trial.21 The 
California Supreme Court agreed and remanded for a new penalty trial.22 
At the retrial, the trial court excluded four statements Cummings had 
made bragging that he had fired all six shots at Vema. 23 The court also 
excluded testimony of an eyewitness identification expert to explain the 
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimony and testimony of 
witnesses that would show that someone else was the shooter.24 The trial 
court also instructed the jury to disregard the defense's opening statement, 
saying that defendant's guilt was conclusively proven and that there would 
be no evidence presented to the contrary.25 The court denied the defense's 
motions for a mistriat.26 
After the retrial, the jury affirmed the verdict of death, and Gay 
appealed. 27 The Supreme Court of California granted review. 28 
II fd. at 429. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. 
14 !d. 
15 !d. at 430. 
16 !d. 
17 !d. 
18 !d. at 426-27. 
19 ld. at 427-29. 
20 !d. at 424. 
21 !d. 
22 !d. 
23 !d. at 434-35. 
24 ld. at 435. 
25 !d. 
26 ld. 
27 !d. at 424. 
28 !d. 
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Analysis 
Gay argued that the evidence suggesting he was not the shooter was 
admissible as relevant under several subdivisions of Section 190.3 of the 
California Penal Code.29 The Court stated that its decision in People v. 
Terry recognized that a defendant may provide evidence in a penalty retrial 
of his version of the circumstances surrounding the crime to support a 
defense of lingering doubt. 30 The Terry court explained that, if a different 
jury decides the guilt and penalty phases, it should hear the defendant's 
version of the facts and decide whether it has any lingering doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt. 31 The In re Gay Court also found that other states 
allowed the presentation of evidence of the circumstances of the offense to 
support a lingering doubt defense in the penalty phase. 32 
The Court stated that error in excluding evidence presented at the 
penalty phase is reversible if there is a "reasonable possibility" that the 
exclusion of the evidence affected the verdict. 33 The Court observed that 
the identity of the shooter was central to Gay's defense.34 The Court also 
noted that only four of the defendant's witnesses were permitted to testify, 
and only one of them actually saw the shooting. 35 The four witnesses who 
saw the shooting and would have supported the defense's theory of 
lingering doubt were not permitted to testify.36 The Court also noted that, 
although Gay was permitted to show that Pamela attempted to shift blame 
for the murder to Cummings, Gay was prevented from showing that 
Cummings himself claimed that he was the shooter.37 
The Court found that the trial court's instructions to the jury and 
exclusion of evidence were prejudicial. 38 The Court reasoned that, while 
the trial court instructed the jury at the close of the evidence on lingering 
doubt, the court did not withdraw its earlier, inconsistent instruction. 39 The 
Court stated that the jury was left confused as to whether it should consider 
the earlier instruction in determining lingering doubt. 40 Thus, the Court 
29 ld. at 436-37 (citing CAL. PEN. CoDE§§ 190.3, 190.3(a), 190.3(j), 190.3(k)). This Section 
provides that, if a defendant has been found guilty of first-degree murder, the trier of fact, in the penalty 
phase, may consider "any matter relevant to ... mitigation and sentence," such as "the nature and 
circumstances of the present offense," CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.3, "[t]he circumstances of the crime of 
which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding," § 190.3(a), "[w]hether or not the 
defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was 
relatively minor," § 190.3(j), or"[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime 
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime,"§ 190.3(k). 
30 Jd. at 437 (citing People v. Terry, 390 P.2d 381 (Cal. 1964)). 
31 Jd. (citing People v. Terry, 390 P.2d 381 (Cal. 1964)). 
32 !d. at 439-40 (citing In re Gay, P.2d 476 (Cal. 1998)). 
33 !d. at 441. 
34 !d. 
35 Jd. 
36 !d. 
37 !d. at 441-42. 
38 !d. at 442. 
39 !d. 
40 Jd. 
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stated, it was impossible to know which of the instructions the jury applied 
in reaching its verdict.41 
The Court concluded that, despite the aggravating evidence presented, 
there was a reasonable possibility that the jury could have selected the 
lesser penalty by finding lingering doubt.42 The Court reasoned that the 
evidence indicating that defendant was not the shooter would have been 
important in determining what penalty to impose.43 
Holding 
The Court held that the trial court's exclusion of evidence that 
defendant was not the shooter during the penalty phase, in support of a 
defense of lingering doubt, was reversible error.44 Thus, the Court reversed 
the judgment of death and ordered a third sentencing trial.45 
Concurrence 
Justice Werdegar clarified that the majority's holding reversed in part 
the previous ruling in In re Gay, in which the Court held that lingering 
doubt evidence is not relevant to the circumstances of the crime. 46 He 
noted that the majority simply ignored the inconsistent holding in In re Gay 
because the previous decision involved a unitary trial, whereas, in the 
present case, the sentencing trial was separate.47 
Legal Significance 
This decision reaffirms the long-standing rule that a defendant can use 
lingering doubt as a mitigating factor to introduce evidence that he was 
innocent of the crime. The ruling essentially overrules the earlier ruling in 
In re Gay, in which the Court implied that a defendant's introduction of 
evidence of innocence was a retrial of guilt. 
In practice, the decision will not affect cases where the same jury 
returns both a guilt and sentence verdict. In those cases, the evidence used 
for the guilt phase will not be introduced for the sentencing phase because 
it is already before the jury. But this holding does provide more guidance 
to trial courts when the sentencing phase is separated from the guilt phase 
of a trial. While a defendant will not be able to question the conviction at 
sentencing, he can provide evidence inconsistent with the conviction to 
persuade the jury that there is still lingering doubt as to his guilt. 
41 !d. at 442-43. 
42 !d. at 443. 
43 !d. at 444. 
44 !d. at 441. 
45 !d. at 444. 
46 !d. (citing In re Gay, 968 P.2d 476 (1998)). 
47 !d. at 445. 
